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  Review of Readings of Wittgenstein's On Certainty by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock Ed. (2007) 
      Michael Starks  
        ABSTRACT 
On Certainty was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s death and has only recently begun to 
draw serious attention. I cannot recall a single reference to it in all of Searle and one sees whole books on W with 
barely a mention. There are however xlnt books on it by Stroll, Svensson, McGinn and others and parts of many 
other books and articles, but hands down the best is that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume 
“Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every educated person, and perhaps the best 
starting point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), psychology, philosophy and life. However (in my view) like all 
analysis of W, they fall  short of grasping his unique and revolutionary advance in describing behavior, suffering 
from the near universal tunnel vision and failing to put behavior in its broad evolutionary and contemporary 
scientific context, which I will attempt in skeletal form here. After doing this I will give brief comments on each 
article in this book of varied perspectives on W’s work. 
 
 Since this review appeared, DMS has written brilliant articles on Wittgenstein’s OC which are mandatory reading. 
Also, a mostly excellent volume by Hamilton “Wittgenstein and On Certainty” *2014) has been published.  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view 
may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016).  For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested 
in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book  Philosophy, Human Nature and the 
Collapse of Civilization  - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016  662p (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
“But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am 
satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and 
false.”(OC 94) 
On Certainty was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s death and has only recently begun to 
draw serious attention.  I cannot recall a single reference to it in all of Searle and one sees whole books on W with 
barely a mention. There are however xlnt books on it by Stroll, Svensson, McGinn and others and parts of many 
other books and articles, but hands down the best is that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume 
“Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every educated person, and perhaps the best 
starting point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), psychology, philosophy and life. However (in my view) like all 
analysis of W (excepting the most recent work by DMS), they fall far short of grasping his unique and revolutionary 
advance in describing behavior, suffering from the near universal tunnel vision and failing to put behavior in its 
broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, which I will attempt in skeletal form here. After doing this 
I will give brief comments on each article in this book of varied perspectives on W’s work. 
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior of all time and this is his last work 
and crowning achievement. It belongs to his third and final period, yet it is not only his most basic work (since it 
shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that our conscious ratiocination is but a 
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gloss on unconscious machinations), but the foundation for all description of animal behavior- revealing how the 
mind works and indeed must work. The “must” is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and 
common genes and so there is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that 
all higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and in humans this is extended 
into a personality based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others (with 
variations that can be regarded as trivial). This book, and arguably all of W’s work and all useful discussion of 
behavior is a development of or variation on these ideas. Another major theme here and of course in all discussion 
of human behavior is the need to separate the effects of culture from those of genetics and though few 
philosophers explicitly discuss this, it can be seen as the major problem they are dealing with. I suggest it will 
prove of the greatest value to consider W’s work and most of his examples as an effort to tease apart not only fast 
and slow thinking (see below), but nature and nurture. 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and psychology, it has become clear that 
what he laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of what 
is now known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, 
higher order thought or just animal behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works are a vast and 
unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was written. He is almost universally 
ignored by psychology and other behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few in philosophy who have 
more or less understood him have not carried the analysis to its logical (psychological) conclusion nor realized the 
extent of his anticipation of the latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (the two selves of fast and slow thinking—
see below). His heir apparent, John Searle, refers to him periodically and his work can be seen as a straightforward 
extension of W’s, but he does not really get that this is what he is doing. Other 
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leading W analysts such as Hutto and Moyal-Sharrock do marvelously but (in my view) stop short of putting him in 
the center of current psychology, where he certainly belongs. I eventually came to understand much of W by 
regarding his corpus as the pioneering effort in EP, seeing that he was describing the two selves and the 
multifarious language games of fast and slow thinking, and by starting from his 3
rd 
period works and reading 
backwards to the proto-Tractatus. It has been extremely revealing to alternate W with the writings of hundreds of 
other philosophers and evolutionary psychologists (as I regard all psychologists and in fact all behavioral scientists, 
cognitive linguists and others). It should also be clear that insofar as they are coherent and correct, all accounts of 
behavior are describing the same phenomena and ought to translate easily into one another. Thus the recently 
fashionable themes of “Embodied Mind” and “Radical Enactivism” should flow directly from and into W’s work. 
However few seem able to follow his example of avoiding jargon and sticking to perspicuous examples, so even the 
redoubtable Hutto (see below) has to be heavily filtered to see that this is true. However, even Hutto does not get 
how completely W has anticipated the latest work in fast and slow, two-self embodied thinking (acting). 
 
W should be regarded as the pioneer of evolutionary cognitive linguistics—the Top Down analysis of the mind and 
its evolution via the careful analysis of examples of language use in context, to expose the many varieties of 
language games and the relationships between the primary games of the true-only unconscious, axiomatic fast 
thinking of perception, memory and reflexive emotions and acts (often described as the subcortical and primitive 
cortical reptilian brain first-self functions), and the later evolved higher cortical dispositional conscious abilities of 
believing, knowing, thinking etc. that constitute the true or false propositional secondary language games of slow 
thinking and the network of cognitive illusions that constitute the second-self personality. He dissects hundreds of 
language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and reflexive actions of system one grade into 
the thinking, remembering, and understanding of system two dispositions and many of his examples also address 
the nature/nurture issue. With this evolutionary perspective, his works are a breathtaking revelation of human 
nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find this 
one not only lets me understand W, but cuts like a hot knife through the frozen butter of discussions of behavior. 
To repeat Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.” 
The failure (in my view) of even the best thinkers (with a few possible exceptions) to fully grasp W’s significance is 
partly due to the limited attention On Certainty (OC) and his other 3
rd 
period works have received, but even more 
to the inability to understand how profoundly our view of philosophy, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, politics, 
law, morals, ethics, religion, aesthetics, literature (all of them being descriptive psychology), alters once we accept 
this evolutionary point of view. The dead hand of the blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily on most 
people, pro or amateur and is the default of the second self of slow thinking conscious system 2, which is oblivious 
to the fact that the groundwork for all behavior lies in the unconscious, fast thinking axiomatic structure of system 
1. 
 
Steven Pinker’s brilliant ‘The Blank Slate: the modern denial of human nature’ is highly recommended preparation, 
even though it is now dated and he has no clue about Wittgenstein, and hence of what can be regarded as the first 
and best really deep investigation into the foundations of human nature. He 
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seems not to fully grasp that the Blank Slate is an expression of the cognitive illusions that constitute our 
mental life. 
To say that Searle has carried on W’s work is not to imply that it is a direct result of W study, but rather that 
because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that 
anyone accurately describing behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of what W said. I find most of 
Searle foreshadowed in W, including versions of the famous Chinese room argument against Strong AI. 
Incidentally if the Chinese Room interests you then you should read Victor Rodych’s xlnt ,but virtually unknown, 
supplement on the CR—“Searle Freed of Every Flaw”. Rodych has also written a series of superb papers on W’s 
philosophy of mathematics (i.e., the EP of the axiomatic system 1 Primary Language Games (PLG’s) of counting as 
extended into the endless Language Games of math). 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of Thought: language as a window into 
human nature”) that language is a window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that there 
must be some other “Language of Thought” of which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried to show, 
with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that language is the best 
picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human nature, and his whole corpus can be regarded as the 
development of this idea. He rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, psychology and 
computation could reveal what his Top Down deconstructions of Language Games (LG’s) did. The difficulties he 
noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes and to capture vagueness (“The greatest difficulty in 
these investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness” LWPP1, 347). And so, speech (i.e., oral muscle 
contractions, the principal way we can interact) is not a window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is 
expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the later evolved Secondary 
Language Games (SLG’s) of the Second Self--the dispositions --imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending 
etc.). Some of W’s favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the different (but interdigitating) LG’s 
of fast and slow thinking (system 1 and 2 or PLG’s and SLG’s),the epiphenomenality of our second self and mental 
life and the impossibility of private language.  The PLG’s are utterances of and descriptions of our involuntary, 
system 1, fast thinking, true only, untestable mental states- our perceptions and memories and involuntary acts, 
while the evolutionarily later SLG’s are descriptions of voluntary, system 2, slow thinking, testable true or false 
dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing etc. He 
recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions 
are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper (e.g., “The greatest danger here is wanting to 
observe oneself” LWPP1, 459). 
W makes these points throughout his works in countless examples and again his whole corpus can be regarded as 
the effort to make this clear. After all, what exactly is the alternative? W showed over and over that standard ways 
of describing behavior (i.e., most of philosophy, and much of descriptive psychology, anthropology, sociology, 
economics, etc.) are either demonstrably false or incoherent. Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of 
regarding “language philosophy” as a separate study apart 
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from other areas of behavior, since language is just another name for the mind.  And, when W says (as he does 
many times) that understanding behavior is in no way dependent on the progress of psychology (e.g., his oft-
quoted assertion “The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a ‘young science’ 
--but cf. another comment that I have never seen quoted “Is scientific progress useful to philosophy? Certainly. 
The realities that are discovered lighten the philosophers task. Imagining possibilities.” (LWPP1, 807). So, he is not 
legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out the fact that our behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest 
picture possible of our psychology. FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are 
fascinating and powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, but all they can do is provide the 
physical basis for our behavior, facilitate our analysis of language games, and extend our EP, which remains 
unchanged (unless genetic engineering is unleashed to change our EP—but then it won’t be us anymore). The 
true-only axioms of ‘’On Certainty’’ are W’s (and later Searle’s) “bedrock” or “background”, which we now call 
evolutionary psychology (EP), and which is traceable to the automated true-only reactions of bacteria, which 
evolved and operates by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF). See the recent works of Trivers and others for a 
popular intro to IF or Bourke’s superb “Principles of Social Evolution” for a pro intro. 
 
Beginning with their innate true-only, nonempirical (nontestable) responses to the world, animals extend their 
axiomatic understanding via deductions into further true only understandings (“theorems” as we might call them, 
but of course like many words, this is a complex language game even in the context of mathematics). Tyrannosaurs 
and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our two hands or our breathing. This totally changes 
ones view of human nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true-only Understandings of 
Agency  (UOA a term I devised 10 years ago) which newborn animals (including flies and worms if UOA is suitably 
defined) have and subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). Likewise the Theory of Evolution ceased to 
be a theory for any normal, rational, intelligent person before the end of the 19
th 
century and for Darwin at least 
half a century earlier. One CANNOT help but incorporate T. rex and all that is relevant to it into our innate 
background via the inexorable workings of EP. Once one gets the logical (psychological) necessity of this it is truly 
stupefying that even the brightest and the best seem not to grasp this most basic fact of human life (with a tip of 
the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others). And incidentally, the equation of logic and our axiomatic psychology is 
essential to understanding W and human nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody else, points out). 
 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot 
be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own 
unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other 
nonsense) cannot really get a foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary fast thinking axioms and not 
testable propositional attitudes. 
It became clear to me recently that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout his work, and 
almost exclusively in OC, are equivalent to the fast thinking or System One that is at the center of current research 
(e.g., see Kahneman--“Thinking Fast and Slow”, but he has no idea W laid out the framework over 50 years ago), 
which is involuntary and unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception and memory, as 
W notes over and over in endless examples. One might call these “intracerebral reflexes” (maybe 99% of all our 
cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). 
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Our slow or reflective, more or less “conscious” (beware another network of language games!) second self brain 
activity corresponds to what W characterized as “dispositions” or “inclinations”, which refer to abilities or possible 
actions, are not mental states, and do not have any definite time of occurrence. But disposition words like 
“knowing”, “understanding”, “thinking”, “believing”, which W discussed extensively, have at least two basic uses 
(or, one might say, one major use and one abuse) or language games—a peculiar philosophical use by exemplified 
by Moore (whose papers inspired W to write OC) which refers to the true-only sentences based on direct 
perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic psychology (‘I know these are my hands’), and their normal use 
as dispositions, which are acted out and which can become true or false (‘I know my way home’). 
 
It was the genetic capture of suitable axioms that enabled our ancestors to avoid underdetermination and 
combinatorial explosion—quadrillions of organisms failed to solve this problem and their corpses make up oil 
and natural gas and they have no descendants. 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel 
prize) and other disciplines under names like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. 
Of course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies 
and discussions will vary from “pure” System One to combinations of One and Two (the norm as W made clear), 
but presumably not ever of slow System Two dispositional thinking only, since any thought or intentional action 
cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network of the “cognitive modules”, “inference engines”, 
“intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, “cognitive axioms” or “background” or “bedrock” (as W and later Searle 
call our EP). 
Another point made countless times by W was that our conscious mental life is epiphenomenal in the sense that it 
does not describe nor determine how we act. It is an obvious corollary of his descriptive psychology that it is the 
unconscious automatisms of System 1 that dominate and describe behavior and that the later evolved conscious 
dispositions (thinking, remembering, loving, desiring, regretting etc.) are mere icing on the cake.  This is most 
strikingly borne out by the latest experimental psychology, which is nicely summarized by Kahneman in the book 
cited (see e.g., the chapter ‘Two Selves’, but of course there is a huge volume of recent work he does not cite). It is 
an easily defensible view that most of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions is wholly compatible with 
and straightforwardly deducible from W. 
Probably the leading exponent of W’s ideas on the language games of inner and outer (the ‘Two Selves’ operation 
of our personality or intentionality or EP etc.) is the prolific Daniel Hutto (DH), who teaches at the same University 
as DMS. His approach is called ‘Radical Enactivism’ and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers. It is 
a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon it is a 
straightforward extensions of W’s 2
nd   
and 3
rd  
period writings. 
He is also author of the best deconstruction I know of Dennett’s preposterous claim to be following in W’s 
footsteps (in fact he is just repeating most of the classic mistakes in grandiose fashion and hasn’t a clue about 
W). But of course one must read Searle too and the title of his famous review of Dennett’s book says it well 
“Consciousness Explained Away”. Incidentally, unlike most philosophers and other scholars, who make little or 
no effort to give the general public access to their papers, Hutto has put 
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nearly every paper (though of course often just proofs and not the final paper) free online at 
www.academia.edu. 
 
Here, as throughout W’s works, understanding is bedeviled by possible alternative and consequently often 
infelicitous translations from often unedited and handwritten German notes, with “Satz” being frequently 
incorrectly rendered as “proposition”(which is a testable or falsifiable statement) when referring to our 
nonfalsifiable psychological axioms, as opposed to the correct “sentence”, which CAN be applied to our axiomatic 
true-only statements such as “these are my hands” or “Tyrannosaurs were large carnivorous dinosaurs that lived 
about 50 million years ago”(and since this is an unavoidable extension of our psychology, what does this imply 
about creationists?). 
 
Incidentally, regarding the view of W as the major pioneer in EP, it seems nobody has noticed that he very clearly 
explained several times specifically and many times in passing, the psychology behind what later became known 
as the Wason Test--long a mainstay of EP research. 
The view that even the brightest philosophers do not really grasp the context in which they are operating is 
perhaps most strikingly illustrated when they attempt to define philosophy. In recent years I have seen such 
definitions by two of those I hold in highest regard—Graham Priest and John Searle, and of course they mention 
truth, language, reality etc., but not a word to suggest it is a description of our innate universal axiomatic 
psychology and its extensions. Priest, by the way, has noted that W was the first to predict the emergence of 
paraconsistent logic. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive Psychology of Higher 
Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have 
constructed over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much to 
Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of 
thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare it with those in 
Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find 
more complete and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would 
have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) 
pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, 
perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W 
demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about 
behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts 
but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness.  
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior 
(LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of 
Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order 
Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary 
or deliberative “Rules” R2  and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes  
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
 
Yes 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes/No 
 
No 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Describe a Mental 
State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary Priority 5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary Content Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary Initiation Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place(H+N,T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily Expressions Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self Contradictions No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
Subliminal Effects No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/Rule Based RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/Analytic A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as COS, Representations, 
truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by 
others ( or COS1 by myself). 
 
*            Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions etc. 
**         Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***       Searle’s Intention In Action 
****     Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****   Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its 
interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy)  only get us further away from the truth.  It is critical to 
note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in its 
context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which 
provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this one.  
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and 
Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
Like all of us, the various writers in “Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” have a difficult time keeping 
nature and nurture distinct and none are even close to the evolutionary analysis given above. 
Here, as throughout descriptive psychology (philosophy) you see virtually no reference to “cognitive modules”, 
“fast thinking”, “The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology”, “Tooby and Cosmides”, “Pinker”, or even John Searle. 
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The editors do note the equivalence of “transcendental” with grammar on p3 but fail to equate “grammar” with 
“logic” and with EP as W did. There is much discussion of W’s use of the term “hinges”(the translators English 
term, not the original German) but nobody seems to see that these are the axioms of System 1 and that “believe 
and know”, when referring to fast thinking, have a similar sense if used in referring to behavior as they would if 
one said of the heart that it “believes” and “knows” that it pumps blood. They are unconscious automatisms in 
either case. 
I found Phillips article (like his other writings) of little interest. One only needs to note that the “missing 
propositions” are the axioms of our EP.   In sharp contrast is that of Stroll, which is very clear and near the bone all 
through with some unfortunate slips. In mid-page 34 he says what stands fast is neither true nor false whereas it is 
crystal clear that the hinges are true only. Also I would strongly disagree with his comment on p41 that OC is “only 
tangentially about knowledge” since it is only by extending the axioms via slow thinking that we have any at all. 
Williams’ article is full of errors but he is very bright and fluent so it could be useful as a teaching tool. Schulte is 
also very bright and thorough as usual, but he needs to refine his awkward prose and take the evolutionary view 
so he can drop the “hinges” and “riverbed” in favor of axiomatic EP.
1
0 
 
I find the definition in DMS’s article of two categories of certainty to be unhelpful and confused—one only needs 
to refer to our axioms and their extensions—and the use here (and everywhere) of “beliefs” when referring to 
true only axioms is to be avoided. 
I am not a fan of Mounce and the jargon filled generalities that constitute his kind of philosophy. W not only 
warned frequently against the craving for generality but his whole corpus is an example of how to avoid it. 
The only good thing about Brenner’s article is the quote from W (an experience I have had countless times). “The 
limit of language is shown by it’s being impossible to describe the fact which corresponds to (is the translation of) a 
sentence, without simply repeating the sentence. (This has to do with the Kantian solution of the problem of 
philosophy).” (CV10). This quote sums up most of his philosophy in his typical brilliant aphoristic fashion.  It is 
certainly not the case that W got his ideas from Kant or anyone else but it points to his realization that Kant 
understood that our psychology was axiomatic. 
Rudd’s article is again of use primarily for illustrating pitfalls for the unwary, with the incessant abuse of context 
free language that W (almost uniquely) avoided. At times (e.g., the end of section 3) he almost seems to 
understand, but elsewhere shows he does not get that W explains how our axiomatic EP is not a test of skepticism 
but rather excludes tests and that the metaphysical use of language is not abnormal (as it is universal), but 
senseless. Nor does he get that W’s description of behavior is no more a theory than description of evolutionary 
biology is a theory, and for the same reason. If he and the skeptic understood just one sentence “A doubt without 
an end is not even a doubt”(OC 625) –i.e., no test then no doubt—it would end skepticism for them. And far from 
just hinting that “Kantian transcendentalism” (axiomatic EP in this context) refutes skepticism (and describes the 
basis of behavior), W has made it the focus of OC. It is however quite clear that it is Kantian or Heideggerian only 
by a very stretched analogy and not by origin. Our EP emerges easily and unavoidably from W, but only by the 
most tortuous routes from K or H. 
Morawetz is mostly excellent but there are grave mistakes, and like most he is much too eager to call W confused. 
He seems to have no understanding of the two selves and the use of “know” and “believe” dispositionally vs 
axiomatically. Nor does he grasp that hinges are axiomatic EP (cognitive modules, templates etc.) and not 
propositions which are the results of their use. 
Pritchard’s essay is depressing as it shows he has absolutely no grasp of W but at least it takes him a page or 
two while many show this in the first sentence or even the title. 
Kober seems unaware of the difference between spirituality and religion—W embraced the former but not the 
latter. Like most who write on this topic he needs to read Boyer and Atran before embarking on further essays on 
religion. 
Minar has some good sections but again the basic thrust of W’s description of the axiomatic basis of behavior 
and the two realms of “belief” escapes him.  W’s therapy was to help us see how the mind
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(language, the world, EP etc.) works but even the best Wittgensteinians have gone astray here—recall Gordon 
Baker’s hallucinatory writings at the end of his career! 
Crary writes well on the unclarity of doubt out of context but shows no general understanding of W’s thrust and so 
of EP, IP, axiomatic psychology, Searle etc., and then proceeds (like nearly everyone) to do exactly what W warned 
about incessantly (and showed how to avoid on nearly every page he ever wrote in his later years) by failing to 
stick to perspicuous examples and by employing a dense and jargon laden prose that is utterly un-Wittgensteinian. 
Maybe the best part is her opening quote from Cavell who, though not really getting to the bottom of things 
either, is brilliant and intuitive here in seeing (as we now ought to frame it) that ethics is based in our axiomatic EP, 
upon which system two makes just the most minimal glosses. 
Finally we come to Read who is quite correct that it is possible to interpret the TLP in ways that show its 
continuity to PI, but then wastes much effort trying to discern whether W can be seen as a Carnapian or a 
Realist—who cares? There are ever so many much bigger fish to fry! Once again (as with all writers) I find his 
opening quote from W more penetrating than anything he writes—“Am I not getting closer and closer to saying 
that in the end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it.”  
